Saturday, October 22, 2011

Transaction Reaction: Panthers/Canucks Trade

A huge deal occurred tonight between familiar trading partners, as the Canucks and Panthers made an intriguing swap. As we all know by now, Vancouver shipped Mikael Samuelsson and Marco Sturm to Florida for David Booth, Steven Reinprecht, and a third round pick in 2013.

When the deal first broke, many hockey people I follow on Twitter questioned the deal from a Florida perspective, and I can understand that viewpoint. Booth is the "name" commodity in the deal, and generally, in a trade, whoever gets the best player "wins the deal." I'm not here to analyze who wins the deal, I'm here to analyze the deal from the frame of reference of Mike Gillis and Dale Tallon. Each is qualified and intelligent; neither would make a deal that they didn't benefit from in some way.

Here's what I believe each GM was thinking when they pulled the trigger on the year's first major trade:

Vancouver Canucks:
The trade is perhaps more easily understood from the Vancouver perspective. The Canucks are a team desperately in need of secondary scoring (outside of the Sedin twins). Booth fits the type of player that they need. He's going to play alongside Kesler, who he played with as a kid growing up in Michigan, and he should fit nicely alongside the former Buckeye. Mason Raymond is still battling injury, and he's an RFA after this season--it might not be necessary to gamble on him now that Vancouver has Booth locked up for three years after this one.

Booth has often been regarded as an up-and-coming player, but he simply hasn't been the same after the crushing Mike Richards hit that concussed him in 2009-10. His 2008-09 season was a great one and earned him the current deal he has now which carries a $4.25 million cap hit. That's a contract I wouldn't have a problem giving to a 60 point scorer in his mid-20s, but the thing is, I'm not sure Booth is that anymore. 

He had a terrible season last year, his first full one since the concussion, and that's even if you ignore his -31 rating, which I will, for reasons discussed on this blog. (It's important to note that Booth's PDO was only about 96 last season, the direct cause for his -31.) Regardless, the thinking is escaping Florida and giving him a change of scenery/a competitive environment should ignite him. Mike Gillis can hope. If he doesn't rebound, he's stuck with a $4.25 million hit and no longer has the contracts of Samuelsson and Sturm coming off the books after this season.

Many people wonder why Florida would give up on him this easily, and I'll address that, but from the Vancouver side, they can afford to take the gamble on Booth. Florida can't. That's the difference. It's also why Steven Reinprecht was included in this deal, as I'll also get to in the Florida section.

As with any move, there are the obvious benefits, and the subtle ones that really make or break the deal.  Most of the Florida benefits fall under the subtle side, however, Vancouver has one of note: the 2013 third-round pick they acquired was actually their own pick, originally traded to Florida for Chris Higgins last season. 

What does this mean? It gives them the freedom to potentially sign a big name 2013 restricted free agent to an offer sheet if they wanted to, as you need to have your own picks as potential compensation. Your list of 2013 RFAs? Among others: Lucic, Hall, Seguin, Pietrangelo, Hornqvist, Wheeler, Marchand, Bogosian, Skinner, Shattenkirk, Eberle. RFA offer sheets might be regarded as taboo today, but in two years, who knows? Getting that flexibility to potentially make a franchise-changing move qualifies as a no-brainer for Gillis. It might also be a fallback option if Booth flops and Vancouver has to buy him out and/or add the secondary scoring they presumably will still be looking for in 2013 should Booth not work out.

Regardless, the opportunity to take an affordable gamble (for them) on a potential 60 point player who's in his prime (age-wise), while giving up a package that upside-wise isn't comparable has to qualify as a good trade for Vancouver. It's clear why Mike Gillis made this move. 

Florida Panthers
It's also clear why Dale Tallon made this move, albeit harder to figure. Let's think about Dale Tallon's reign as Florida Panther GM. Committed to reshaping the franchise, at the deadline last year, Tallon cleared out the bulk of the team to any and all buyers, receiving only expiring contracts in return. It's almost as if Tallon did not care whatsoever what kind of team he sent out on the ice in March and April of last season, as long as their deals came off the books July 1, 2011. Those expiring contracts gave Tallon the roster space, and to a lesser extent, cap space, to shape the team as he desired. That resulted in the big free agent frenzy this summer, and also this trade.

It's clear that Tallon did not think that David Booth was part of the Panthers core. There were rumors of Booth being shopped last season, so it didn't surprise me one bit he was moved. If you're Dale Tallon, what can you reasonably get for Booth? He hasn't been the same player since his concussion, and in the Crosby/Savard/Mueller aftermath, Tallon isn't going to convince anyone otherwise. At the same time, he doesn't want to pay a player $4.25 million a year if he doesn't believe in him being part of the franchise's future. So a trade is a given.

But what can you get in return? No team is going to give up an appreciable young asset for the reasons I described above. Tallon's only option was to make another expiring contract trade. If he could have gotten young talent that he liked in exchange for Booth, he definitely would have. GMs make the best trades they can make when a situation like this comes up. It's like the Dany Heatley trade from Ottawa to San Jose--Bryan Murray admitted he didn't think he was getting the better of the deal from a raw player-for-player evaluation, but it was simply the best offer he had received. This offer from Vancouver was undoubtedly the type of deal Florida would have had to make, and it helps them in several other ways too.

1) They no longer have to pay Booth. Like I said, he clearly wasn't fitting into their core. This is still a team that's a few years away. If Booth didn't fit into those plans in two years, it makes no sense to keep him around now. Plus, even in the small sample size of this season, Kris Versteeg and Tomas Fleischmann look better than Booth, who had been pushed to second line duty.

2) They no longer have to pay Reinprecht. I guarantee you that this was the key point of the deal for Tallon. Florida is a team that can't afford to stash salaries in the minors. With Steven Reinprecht down in San Antonio, that's essentially $2.175 million of literal wasted money for Florida (his cap hit is slightly less, but in this instance, raw salary is the number that matters). Without question, Tallon insisted that if he was going to take perceived lesser talent back for Booth, the other team had to take Reinprecht's salary with him. Vancouver can stash Reinprecht in the AHL, where his cap hit won't count and his paycheck won't matter. That latter statement doesn't apply to Florida and it's extremely important for a small-market team like the Panthers.

3) They get two expiring contracts while still staying above the floor for this season. I can see this being the pattern for Tallon. He's finding creative ways to maintain and build a young core while complying with the salary cap floor. I can see him acquiring a few more contracts like Samuelsson's and Sturm's this season if the team doesn't contend, and quite honestly, I doubt it will. I could even see him trading a few of the big names he signed this offseason for players with expiring contracts if the team falls out of it. Don't count this out, by the way. It makes total sense.

4) They get a player who can potentially help them this year. I'm not as sold on this fact as the Panthers president appears to be, but still, Samuelsson can play. He's a big body who doesn't always play big, but still, he's scored 50 points in back-to-back seasons and isn't a totally worthless throwaway. He doesn't play defense and is unlikely to gain consideration to be re-signed next year, but you could do a lot worse if you were trying to trade for a player solely because his deal expires in the off-season. I'm disregarding Sturm from this classification because he's done and is solely a throw-in.

---

An all-around fascinating move, and another great example of a trade that has more underlying explanations than "player A is better than player B." Both teams knew just what they were doing and what they were getting. Vancouver gets the potential top 6 forward they need. Florida gets more cap flexibility on their rebuilding path and sheds a huge contract they clearly didn't believe in anymore. In my opinion, a good trade for both sides once the respective goals are understood.

Wednesday, October 19, 2011

The Steve Mason Dilemma

This time of the year is typically pretty thin on transactions, and there hasn't been much to write about re: player movement. That might change soon, however, given the poor start of the Columbus Blue Jackets. Off to an 0-5-1 start, the CBJ remain the NHL's only winless team and are already seven points behind first-place Detroit in the Central.

While most teams will wait slow starts out, perhaps no team can afford to do that less than Columbus. Attendance at Nationwide Arena, typically dull around this time of year anyway (it tends to pick up slightly after Ohio State football season), is only going to dwindle further with each and every loss. What makes this year especially different from other years is the financial commitment John McConnell gave to Scott Howson and the team.

The Jackets are essentially spending to the cap this year. That's a remarkable change for a team that traditionally hovers in the lower-to-mid third and hasn't gotten any significant boost in attendance, let alone a team that is experiencing all-time lows, as the CBJ have been recently. They already reportedly lose millions each year, and increasing the payroll by 50% isn't exactly a typical reponse to these types of losses.

The team looks to be close to receiving a bailout-of-sorts from the city by diverting local casino revenue, so the threat of relocation seems to be dormant. The team's financial setbacks should improve with this new deal as well. Regardless, the attendance issue is still there, and franchise player Rick Nash will only be in his prime for so long. Ignoring off-ice finances, spending to the cap for a 30th place team is obviously concerning.

So what options does Scott Howson have? Let's take a look at the Jackets from a GM's standpoint, focusing on the one area that has been scrutinized the most: the goaltending.

It's been fashionable for fans to blame Steve Mason for the CBJ's woes, and much of it is deserved. It's no secret that he has never been able to regain the form he showed in his rookie year. He posted a 19.8 GVT that season and has been unable to even crack positive numbers in the two years since. He also ranked third in the league in Goals Against/60 at even strength in 2008-09, and then dropped to 19th and 24th in the past two seasons. What are possible reasons for this decline?

For starters, Mason's teammates were great in front of him in his Calder season in 08-09, allowing the fewest shots/60 minutes at even strength (25.9). That number went up to 29.4 in 2009-10, and stayed at 28.9 in 2010-11. That extra four shots makes a lot of difference.

Let's look at another area where Columbus has been victimized: they've gotten worse at penalty killing. The Jackets' 4v5 shorthanded shots against per 60 has ballooned from 49.2 in Mason's Calder year to 52.3 and 53.4 over the past two seasons. These shots faced are also presumably of better quality than the even strength numbers.

Conclusion? The even strength and power play shots against increase over the last three seasons of Mason's career are, in my opinion, as much to blame for his "decline" as anything.

All the while, Columbus's even strength shots for/60 has remained pretty constant, indicative of the team's possession numbers getting worse solely through allowing more shots. In other words, they're still shooting the puck at the same rate as their dream playoff season. Everybody wants to know the difference between the 08-09 Jackets team and the past two iterations. Here it is: they've been allowing more shots at even strength and on the penalty kill. That's the change in performance that needs to be addressed.

I believe that the team isn't bad because of Mason, they just aren't getting any better in front of him. It's no secret that goaltenders need time to develop--more time than any other position. Mason is the same goaltender he was in 2008-09, his defense has just been much worse since that season.

It's amazing what an improvement in the team in front of him did for a goalie like Marc-Andre Fleury, a goalie who debuted strong early but went through some struggles, including being prone to the softie. Sound familiar?

I firmly believe Mason has the ability to develop much like Fleury did. The alternative development (the Andrew Raycroft route) is still a possibility, but if Howson bails and sells low on Mason, who is still just 23 years old, I believe the acquiring team could be getting a potential franchise goaltender if they give him time to develop.

In this instance, Howson doesn't necessarily have the time to wait, and rumors have him talking to many teams about a  goaltending acquisition. I believe this would be a mistake. Mason has a friendly contract at $2.9 mil this year and next, and then is an RFA, under team control until he's 27. Replacements would either be veteran short-term fixes (Evgeni Nabokov) or incredibly expensive, young backups who have potential equal to Mason's, in my opinion (Cory Schneider).

I believe it would also be incredibly rash to acquire offense, especially considering that the team's shooting percentage is currently at  6.74%. We would expect that to normalize closer to the 9% range as the season progresses, especially once James Wisniewski, Jeff Carter, and to a lesser extent, Kristian Huselius return.

Jackets fans are also well aware about the team's dismal power play, which has seemingly spilled over to this season. I don't worry too much about the power play woes because the Jackets haven't had Wisniewski or a healthy Carter in their lineup. Those major acquisitions, combined with further development of players like Grant Clitsome and Kris Russell on the other point, should improve the PP. It just hasn't had a chance to even get started.

(Also, while it's out of their control, let's point out that the CBJ have played in one of the strongest divisions in the NHL over the past few seasons. It isn't an excuse, but it's important to note.)

Despite his wonderful offensive acquisitions, Howson hasn't done much to address the possession issues this team has had for the past two seasons.  I believe that should be the primary area of focus if he desires to make a quick fix. It would also be the most cost-efficient. You pay money for the big point scorers like Jeff Carter and James Wisniewski. Howson has done that. Next step: finding secondary players on forward and defense who can suppress shots against, keep possession, and play a disciplined game.

Wednesday, October 12, 2011

Transaction Reaction: The Dallas Stars' Day

Sean Avery officially came off the books for the Stars and Rangers with his assignment to the AHL, but only as far as cap hit is concerned. (Both teams still have to pay him, of course.) The Rangers, a team that typically spends to the upper limit, were understandably happy about the extra cap space.

But the Stars sure weren't. Why? Well, first consider that the Stars are in a major ownership crisis and thus don't spend to the cap. In fact, they don't even come close, because they can't afford it. They don't have any real need or use for extra cap space. And, as Bob McKenzie tweeted, Avery's demotion meant that Stars were actually in danger of being under the floor. They had to do something to replace Avery's dead space.

When the day started this morning, the Stars had their active 23-man roster, plus Adam Pardy and Scott Glennie on the IR. This meant that they had 25 players on their NHL roster.

Usually, players on IR count toward the cap, which would mean Dallas could count Pardy's $2,000,000 and Glennie's $1,620,000 hit towards their cap. However, only Pardy's cap hit counts towards Dallas' total.

I was informed today by CapGeek that Glennie does not count towards Dallas' cap. CapGeek cited Article 15.6 as the reason why, which refers to the compensation players who break training camp on the injury list receive. Both Glennie and Pardy fit into this scenario. CapGeek assured me that Glennie counts as zero.

Because said compensation is defined in Article 15.6 as a rate based off where he played last season, and Glennie spent last season in the WHL and AHL (leagues that do not carry an NHL cap hit), his compensation this season does not count towards the salary cap. Because Pardy spent last season in the NHL, his cap hit does count.

Here is the aforementioned CapGeek FAQ on the subject

So, because Glennie doesn't count towards Dallas' cap, and Pardy does, Dallas only has 24 cap-accountable players. Those 24 players combined to give Dallas a cap hit of $48,817,500. That number is only $517,500 over the floor of $48,300,000. To activate Adam Pardy, Dallas will have to comply with the 23-man active roster rule and send somebody down. The problem is, if they were to do that with their roster as it stood this morning, they would have been under the cap floor. Here's why:

The lowest skater cap hit Dallas could possibly send down is $775,000 (Toby Petersen or Tom Wandell - they do have goalie Andrew Raycroft making less but they need to carry two goaltenders, obviously). Since Petersen and Wandell are forwards, and Pardy is a defenseman, it's more likely that Dallas will send down a D-man when Pardy returned. Currently, the lowest possible Cap hit for a Dallas defenseman is Philip Larsen at $850,000. 

Assuming that Dallas sends down Larsen when Pardy returns, this puts them $332,500 under the floor. To get in compliance, Dallas found themselves needing to make a transaction that resulted in an increased cap hit of at least that $332,500. 

Let's go over what Joe Nieuwendyk's possible in-house solutions were:  he could have called up Jamie Oleksiak to replace Petersen or Wandell, as Oleksiak's entry-level cap hit would have covered the difference required. However, calling him up to either play before he's ready or sit in the pressbox every game would be terrible for his development. It would also start his entry-level contract "clock" if he hits that magic 10th game, as he is a slide risk, and I'm sure Nieuwekdyk had no intentions whatsover of doing that. Also, Oleksiak is a defenseman, so this offers no real benefit for Dallas whatsoever.

He could also have called up goaltending prospect Jack Campbell and send Raycroft down, but again, that would be terrible for Campbell's development.

Seeing no real internal solution, the Stars had to look outside the organization, so they acquired Eric Nystrom from the Wild for future considerations. By adding Nystrom, they had to send somebody down to stay compliant with the 23-man active roster, so they sent Tomas Vincour down.

Dallas assumed Nystrom's full cap hit of $1,400,000. Vincour's cap hit is $800,000. Adding Nystrom and subtracting Vincour added $600,000 to Dallas' team cap hit, which is in excess of the $332,500 they needed. This means that if Adam Pardy is activated, and if Philip Larsen is sent down as the concurrent move, Dallas will be $267,500 clear of the floor.

It's interesting to note that Dallas could have claimed Nystrom off re-entry waivers a few days ago, but that wouldn't have helped them as all, because the half-cap-hit of $700,000 would actually make their deficit relative to the floor worse.

Dallas needed to find a way to take on salary once Pardy was healthy, and they've done so with this trade. An all-around crazy situation.

Goals Versus Threshold (GVT) and My Small-Market Team

Note: A good friend and loyal reader asked me on Twitter what the GVT stat means in my previous post. I don't profess to have invented it; that credit goes to Tom Awad and Hockey Propectus. However, I have researched it and value it as a great all-around metric for determining value.

GVT is to hockey what VORP is to baseball. It strips away the winning and losing aspect of hockey and equates player statistics to goals. Regardless of a team's performance, all a player is trying to do is increase goal differential in his team's favor, whether offensively or defensively. He can't control what happens when he isn't on the ice, even though that might make the complete difference towards the outcome of the game. GVT takes a player's individual contribution and scales it relative to replacement value. We can then use that to predict how a team will do.

For example, let's take my "perfect small market team" from the last post. Let's look at Jonathan Toews. His GVT last year was 20.8. That means he contributed, through offensive, defensive, shootout, and goaltending totals, +20.8 more to the Blackhawks' goal differential than a replacement-level player would. His breakdowns are as follows:

OGVT: 13.7
DGVT: 5.7
SGVT: 1.4
GGVT: 0 (obviously, Toews is not a goaltender)
Total: 20.8

These totals isolate Toews' performance to the various areas of the game. What stands out to me: 5.7 DGVT is very good for a forward. Selke winner Ryan Kesler also posted a 5.7. Noted defensive guru Pavel Datsyuk posted a 2.3. Bottom line, everyone knows Toews is a great scorer by looking at his points numbers, but GVT can show us a real boost in his value because of his defense. This is why Toews ranked as highly as any skater in the league last season despite lagging some 15-20 points behind players like Martin St. Louis, Corey Perry, and the Sedin twins.

We can also use GVT to predict team performance. I emailed Mr. Awad about the calculation this morning, and he was gracious enough to respond to me. The first step is to sum the player GVT contributions of all players. Again, reference my perfect small-market team. The total player GVT was 258.7. However, this doesn't represent team GVT, since we have to account for replacement level. Replacement level is defined as 1.5 goals per game, or 123 goals for the season. We subtract this out from the player summation to find that my perfect small market team would have a goal differential of 135.7. As mentioned, this would be the highest goal differential since the lockout by a wide margin.

But that's not all. We can then scale this predicted goal differential to get a predicted point output. Mr. Awad was extremely helpful in sharing the formula with me, so credit to him here. 3 GVT = 1 point in the standings. So our imaginary team of 258.7 GVT would have a predicted point output of (258.7 divided by 3) 86.2333 points above replacement level. We then add in replacement level of 50 points to get a predicted output of about 136 points for my imaginary team.

How was that 50 points derived? Remember that the replacement level GVT is 123 goals for the season. Divide that by 3, and we get 41 points for a replacement level, 123 goal team. The exact average point total of a team since the lockout is 91. Subtract 41 from 91 and we get 50.

Important: A team full of 0 GVT players would not produce 0 goals! They would just produce 0 goals above replacement level.  A team with nothing but replacement level players would produce a goal differential of 1.5 per game, or 123 for the season. Anything above that results in a positive GVT. Anything below that results in a negative GVT. That's why, just like VORP in baseball, we can see players with a negative GVT, and why it's possible for a team with a positive GVT player summation to have a negative team GVT: if a team's player GVT summation doesn't exceed 123, we would expect that team to have a negative goal differential for the season.

A great story appeared in the New York Post today about the hockey sabermetric movement. It's also worth a read.

Tuesday, October 11, 2011

The Perfect Small-Market Team

For this post, I'm going to imagine that I'm building a team under a self-imposed cap of $53.6 million. I got this number by taking the range between the lower limit ($48.3mm) and the upper limit ($64.3mm) and dividing it by three, thus creating a "lower third" upper limit of $53.6 million. Currently, only seven teams in real life are below that number (WPG, NYI, NAS, CAR, PHX, COL, DAL). Keep those roster structures in mind when analyzing my team.

Also, I'm going to limit the amount of players on entry-level deals. I want to try to assemble a team that could feasibly exist. It's not realistic to say "I'm going to take all of the top draft picks from the past three years and make a team! So much potential and so cheap!" However, most NHL teams do employ multiple players on entry-level deals. I'm going to attempt to replicate that without loading up on entry-level studs too much.

Additionally, entry-level deals have CBA-restricted limits on cap hit. I want to find players who have had fair market value applied to them through non-entry-level deals, and I want to exploit those who have been undervalued.

Forwards:

Jonathan Toews (CHI) - GVT: 20.8 - Cap Hit: $6,300,000
Stud. Toews excels in every situation, has a team-friendly contract, is an incredible captain, and has done these things consistently for the past four seasons. And he's only 24. Sign us up.

Bobby Ryan (ANA) - GVT: 16.4 - Cap Hit: $5,100,000
For this hypothetical team, he would fill the role of "player that's on the fringe of stardom, but because this is a small market, we're going to market him like a secondary star" player. Locked up at a comfortable $5.1mm hit for the next four years, love his youth and progression. Getting better defensively and starting to kill penalties in real life, but we won't need him to do that here.

Dustin Brown (LA) - GVT: 13.0 - Cap Hit: $3,175,000
Ridiculously affordable, Dustin Brown is entering his age-27 season, has put up 50 points in four straight years, has high hit totals for a top line forward, can play on the power play and on the penalty kill, and has enough leadership skills to be LA captain. Signed through 2013-14, Los Angeles fans are lucky to have him.

Michael Grabner (NYI) - GVT: 16.8 - Cap Hit: $3,000,000
Got a deserved raise in the offseason after his breakout campaign, the speedy skater is still only entering his age-24 season, has been with three organizations, and has a 16.8 GVT season under his belt. Signed at the nice number of $3mm for the next five years, too.

David Krejci (BOS) - GVT: 11.2 - Cap Hit: $3,750,000
He's in the last year of his deal at this price, but we'll enjoy him while we can. A nice piece down the middle that also contributes in both ends of the rink. Starting to up his offensive game to elite levels.

Tyler Ennis (BUF) - GVT: 8.9 - Cap Hit: $875,000
As I mentioned in the introductory post, it would be like fake-salary-cap circumvention to load up a team of entry-level contracts, but real teams use young entry-level talent because it's cheaper, so this fake team is allowed to do so as well. Ennis is a rising star, a bit undersized, but makes up for it with high-level skating. Will certainly get a nice raise once his entry-level deal is up.

Frans Nielsen (NYI) - GVT: 13.1 - Cap Hit: $525,000
My vote for biggest bargain in the entire league. I'm not sure if that mathematically is the case based on GVT, but he's an absolute steal playing out the last year of a 4-year, $2.1mm contract on the Island. Kills penalties, is a defensive stud, and is starting to add a scoring touch. Too much of a value. I just added 13.1 goals to this team for $525,000. For comparison's sake, Dustin Penner contributed 4.6 goals for $4.25m.

Matt D'Agostini (STL) - GVT: 8.4 - Cap Hit: $1,650,000
A player that was forgotten about in Montreal, D'Agostini blossomed in St. Louis where he finally got a chance to showcase his offensive talents. Signed a two-year deal at $1.650mm, he'll fit nicely in a third line, secondary scoring role for this team.

Nikolai Kulemin (TOR) - GVT: 12.7 - Cap Hit: $2,350,000
Benefited from a high shooting percentage last season, but nevertheless, is a nice fit on this team as a third line player. Still only entering his age-25 season, it feels like he's been around a lot longer.

Matt Cooke (PIT) - GVT: 8.0 - Cap Hit: $1,800,000
I really think Matt Cooke's negative reputation for cheap shots is good for the Penguins. It shrouds his true talent and keeps his cap hit down. For all the flack Cooke gets for dirty hits, he deserves just as much praise for his stud penalty killing, intense forechecking, and ability to throw in some offensive touch. A controversial piece, yes, but an incredibly useful one.

Brandon Prust (NYR) - GVT: 6.3 - Cap Hit: $800,000
I hate the role of enforcer, but recognize that someone that's willing to drop the gloves is necessary. If I'm going to employ a fighter, he has to be able to contribute in other ways. Prust can do that. Not a heavyweight, but is willing to scrap with anyone, and can also kill penalties and score above his fourth-line role.

Craig Adams (PIT) - GVT: 3.5 - Cap Hit: $675,000
An undervalued forward that helps you win games in ways that don't show up in the box score. He can kill penalties, throw hits, and provide rock solid defense. I'm not expecting scoring, but these are the players you need to win Stanley Cups, and he's a total steal at $675k. He provides the intangibles you can't measure with statistics.

Erik Christensen (NYR) - GVT: 7.3 - Cap Hit: $925,000
Everyone knows Christensen's deal: he is a beast in the shootout. That makes him the perfect depth forward to me. He can contribute offensively, but having him on the roster is mainly for his shootout skill, and that's something that I think is incredibly important in today's NHL regular season.


Defensemen:

Duncan Keith (CHI) - GVT: 10.3 - Cap Hit: $5,538,462
Keith slipped last season to a 10 goal player after his Norris-winning 22 GVT campaign in 09-10. The truth is, he's probably somewhere in the middle. I'm going to count on the bounceback and plug him in as my stud, minutes-eating defender at a nice rate of $5,538,462.

Niklas Kronwall (DET) - GVT: 10.5 - Cap Hit: $3,000,000
Kronwall has one year left on his deal at $3mm. He's certainly due a big raise next season as well. For now, I'll enjoy his double digit GVT as I use him on both the power play and the penalty kill. A true all-situations defenseman.

Ryan Suter (NAS) - GVT: 10.0 - Cap Hit: $3,500,000
I'm kind of cheating here, as Suter is well-known to be in the last year of his deal and will most likely get a Shea Weber-type raise next season, because he can simply do it all.

Alex Pietrangelo (STL) - GVT: 15.1 - Cap Hit: $3,166,666
His entry-level contract slid for two straight years, as he never got the call to the show for longer than the nine-game limit. Played 79 last season and took off. The complete package, young, and still on his entry-level deal through next year.

Michael Sauer (NYR) - GVT: 7.1 - Cap Hit: $1,250,000
A pleasant surprise for the Rangers, Sauer is young and a great fit as a third-pairing defender for a great price that is locked in for next year as well.

Alec Martinez (LA) - GVT: 5.7 - Cap Hit: $737,500
His entry level deal just expired, and the 2-year extension he signed actually features a decrease in cap hit, a year after putting up a 5.7 GVT season as a 23 year old with stellar offensive potential.

Ben Lovejoy (PIT) - GVT: 6.8 - Cap Hit: $525,000
I talked about him in my manifesto post. Note that he is making the NHL minimum. Also note that Ray Shero has him signed for the said minimum for this year and next. He probably won't be making the minimum after 2013.

Goaltending:

Pekka Rinne (NAS) - GVT: 36.5 - Cap Hit: $3,400,000
Just a huge season for the UFA-to-be. Still in his 20s, and a model of consistency. Considered Price for this role due to his age, but Rinne is simply a better goaltender right now. Both are due raises this offseason

Brent Johnson (PIT) - GVT: 10.3 - Cap Hit: $600,000
The best backup goalie in the NHL. (I'd put Martin Biron 2nd in that category, by the way). Johnson has played between 21 and 23 games the past three seasons, and last year, his GVT spiked to double digits. His save percentage is likely to regress, but you can do a whole lot worse for a backup. 29 other NHL teams have, in fact.

Forwards - GVT: 146.4 - Cap Total: $30,925,000
Ryan - Toews - Brown
Ennis - Krejci - Grabner
Kulemin - Nielsen - D'Agostini
Cooke - Adams - Prust
Christensen

Defensemen - GVT: 65.5 - Cap Total: $17,717,628
Keith - Suter
Kronwall - Pietrangelo
Martinez - Sauer
Lovejoy

Goaltending - GVT: 46.8 - Cap Total: $4,000,000
Rinne
Johnson

TEAM TOTALS 
Cap Number: $52,642,628
Sum of player GVT: 258.7
Expected Goal Differential aka Team GVT: 135.7
Projected Points: 136

This team would probably win the President's Trophy with ease with a projected 136 points. By GVT predictions, it would finish with a positive goal differential of 135.7. Last season, the top mark was Vancouver, with +77. The NHL record is +216, by 1976–77 Montreal Canadiens, but that was of course a different era. Since the lockout, and the salary-cap era, the record for goal differential is 103, by the 05-06 Senators.

Remember that this team would garner that high of a goal differential with a payroll that would rank it 7th lowest in the league. What does this tell us?

One, it tells us that value is out there. NHL teams don't need to drop huge money on ten-year type deals to acquire talent that can win games.

Notice the quality of forwards I have assembled. Every one has a role, and every one does that role near the top of the NHL. I especially like the penalty killing and physicality of the team.

Perhaps more importantly, notice the lack of a major gap in GVT across the board. The lower-line forwards are posting GVTs all in the 5-10 range, while the top line forwards are in the 13-20 range. This isn't typical for an NHL team, which will mostly never see more than one lower line forward touch 6-7 GVT. This tells me that you can win a lot of extra games by rounding out the team wisely. Those fourth line forwards and third pairing defenseman can make a huge difference; I've shown that here.

The most important fact, however: a lot of these guys are coming off career years. We can expect some regression. I'd expect the team GVT to probably come down to the upper double-digit range. That's still phenomenal, and we'd still have a Cup contender on our hands, it just wouldn't be historic.

This was just for fun, and I enjoyed researching these great values. Think of this not so much as a realistic team, but as a list of some values, some established players, and how they could come together to create a very successful NHL team for a price tag that any market could afford.

Monday, October 10, 2011

Transaction Reaction: Cumiskey to the Ducks

Welcome to the first "Transaction Reaction" segment of the blog. Each time there's a trade or signing of note, I'm going to analyze it, attempting to think it out from each GM's point of view. I don't profess to have any inside knowledge, this is just my brain attempting to process a deal from each side and sharing my thoughts.


On my way home from the Panthers-Islanders game Saturday, my Twitter feed informed me that the Ducks had acquired Kyle Cumiskey from the Avs for defenseman Jake Newton and a seventh round pick. Pretty minor deal, I thought. The Ducks are currently without Toni Lydman and Kurtis Foster, of course, so acquiring a defenseman to fill a void for a bit made sense to me. I then saw another note on the trade: Cumiskey had cleared waivers less than 24 hours before being traded to the Ducks.

Why would Anaheim trade for a player they could have claimed off waivers mere hours earlier? After thinking this out and having a nice conversation on Twitter with a Ducks fan and fellow aspiring GM about the issue, here's what I believe Anaheim GM Bob Murray was thinking:

By claiming Cumiskey off waivers, the only perceivable benefit that the Ducks garner is not having to send any type of compensation to Colorado (disregarding the fairly insignificant waiver fee).

But by trading for him, they gain several additional benefits:

1) If the Ducks had claimed Cumiskey, he would have required waivers again to be sent to the AHL (since he wouldn't have cleared them if he had been claimed). When Foster and Lydman come back, it's safe to assume Anaheim intends to send Cumiskey to Syracuse. By trading for Cumiskey after he cleared waivers, he remains waiver-exempt for 10 NHL games or 30 calendar days. If Anaheim gets healthy on defense in this roughly month-long time period, they can send Cumiskey down without risking losing him on waivers. This would not be the case if they had claimed him.

2) Anaheim is a relatively small-market team. Actual salaries matter to them, at least, much more than they do to the giants of the game. A team like the Rangers can afford to stash Sean Avery and Wade Redden in the minors. Anaheim probably can't. Jake Newton's AHL salary is $67,500 this season. By trading him for Cumiskey's $105,000, the Ducks only take on an additional $37,500 in actual salary, rather than $105,000 (note: cap hits aren't important here because the Ducks are under the upper limit, and AHL players are of course not included in any salary cap calculation).

3) By sending Colorado a player for Cumiskey, the Ducks don't have to take on an extra contract towards the 50-contract limit. CapGeek had the Ducks at 47 contracts before the trade. Claiming Cumiskey would mean that they would have been two away from the limit. Sending the Avalanche a spare part-type player means that they can keep some extra flexibility on their 50-contract quota without doing much damage to the depth of their system.

I believe that Bob Murray went through a very similar thought process when he decided to pick up a new defenseman for a short-term fix. Ultimately, he decided that trading a spare-part and a low draft pick was worth the benefits he got from not having to claim Kyle Cumiskey off waivers.

This is just one example of how even the most seemingly minor of transactions can matter tons to an NHL team's structure.

How I Evaluate Players

Disclaimer: Nothing in this post is going to be new, or groundbreaking. I'm not that advanced (yet). I've read a lot about this game, and I agree with some things more than others. I'm here to share with you what I agree with and what I believe.

1. Everything Is Relative

Too many times, I hear and read fans say things like, "Why did we sign Player X! He's terrible! Only 30 points last season and he's 34 years old!" or "Wow, Player Y is incredible. I'm so happy we traded for him yesterday! He's coming off four straight 60 point seasons!" Most fans can process simple stats like goals, assists, +/- (more on that later), etc to determine how good a player is. The problem is, they process these things in a vacuum.

It's not enough to tell me that Player X scored 30 points in his age 34 season, or that Player Y racked up 60 points four straight years. I need to know (at least) one other thing: cap hit. People know the cap exists, they might even have basic knowledge of how it works. Yet, too often, they can't seem to take it into account when evaluating talent.

This doesn't make any sense to me, because people use and process relative value in other aspects of life all the time, even at the very hockey games they watch and make these shallow observations. How many people out there don't like to buy beer or a cheeseburger at an NHL arena because it costs $9? And how many of those same people will gladly buy the same product before or after the game at the cheap dive bar two blocks from the arena?

I have read the entire NHL CBA and I have made it a point to know the salary cap and its rules like the back of my hand. I don't profess to know it better than any NHL GM, but I know it better than 99% of fans. I guarantee you this, and to be honest, I should know it that well if I take myself serious in this industry. It's possible that my perceptions are altered by the priority I put on the quirks of the cap that most people don't even know. But really, the extreme basics of the cap are easy to understand, and they should shape people's opinion more than they do.

Let's take a look at all of the NHL players with current cap hits above $7m, courtesy of capgeek.com, the greatest site in the universe:



Almost any fan would love to have anyone on this list on their team. Fans need to stop thinking that way. I look at this list and think ,"Wow, nearly every one of these guys is entirely overpaid." I consider only three of these players worth their price: Stamkos, Weber, and Doughty. If Crosby didn't have the concussion scare, he would be a fourth. I consider every other contract on this list to be a burden to the team, relatively speaking.

The NHL salary cap is a puzzle; it's a game within a game. It's like trying to pack belongings into a confined suitcase. Maybe you don't need your huge laptop. Maybe you are better off with just your cell phone, which admittedly can't do as much as your laptop, but it can get you by, and by packing the cell phone instead of the laptop, you have space for other useful additions. You're trying to create the most efficient load in the size of your suitcase. Efficiency and relative value is the key.

There are exceptions, I get that. Pittsburgh can afford to pay Evgeni Malkin what he wanted because they have managed to convince all of their other stars and role-players to take nice discounts. Florida can afford to take on Brian Campbell's huge deal because they needed to get to the salary cap floor. The Blue Jackets needed to make a major commitment to Rick Nash to get him to give up his UFA years and stay in Columbus. That's why I bolded and italicized "relatively speaking" above. But it's about time fans started to analyze trades and free agent signings thinking about the cap hits concurrently with the goals and assists.

Another relative aspect of statistics that I need to know: ice time. If a fringe defenseman puts up 30 points getting only 8 minutes a game, this is better than someone putting up 60 in 20 minutes a game. Not that difficult to understand, but often overlooked. Hint: look at Ben Lovejoy's stats from last season. He ranked 2nd in the entire NHL in even-strength points/60 minutes among defensemen with 40+ games. This made him the second most valuable Pittsburgh defenseman, behind only Kris Letang. Yes, Ben Lovejoy contributed more towards Pittsburgh's goal differential, given his ice time, than Paul Martin, Brooks Orpik, or Zbynek Michalek. Hard to believe, but true. (credit: Hockey Prospectus)

Important: Am I trying to say that I would rather have Lovejoy than Orpik? Or that I would like to give Lovejoy Orpik's minutes? Absolutely not. What I am saying is that Lovejoy fits his currently established role way better than probably anyone else in the league. And he's the type of player I would look to acquire for this role, on the cheap, if I were a GM.

This is so paramount to the way I think about hockey that I plan to blog and write about every major transaction, analyzing it from this standpoint. In the future, I'm also going to share with you my thoughts on best and worst contracts. Obviously, most of the "worst" entries are in the list above. My thoughts on "best" may surprise you. Lovejoy would be a prime example, for one. The reasoning behind the others mostly has to do with the rest of this blog entry.

2. Most Individual Stats Are Horrible, But Some Are More Horrible Than Others

+/- is the most overrated statistic ever. It's a lot like pitcher wins or batter RBI in baseball. Too much of it, and in fact the majority of it, depends on teammates. Whoever invented it had great intentions, but didn't think about the big picture. On the surface, it's a great idea: let's record goals scored while Player A is on the ice for both his team and the opponents, and whoever has the highest difference is probably a better player, right? The obvious flaw with this: a player can get a +/- change for plays that he potentially had nothing to do with. Example: David Backes is in front of the net on the Blues power play. Kevin Shattenkirk is on the point. Shattenkirk tries to make a cross-ice pass, it gets picked off for a breakaway, and Mike Richards pots the six billionth shorthanded goal of his career. Backes has no responsibility to defend that, he was doing everything right, and yet he takes a minus-1 for his efforts.

Most people can see this shortcoming. What isn't readily apparent is this: players sometimes ARE involved in the play, DO make consequential decisions, and can still get/not get pluses or minuses they do/don't deserve. That sounded confusing, so let me give you some extreme, made-up examples:

1) Alex Goligoski makes an incredible cross-ice pass to Jamie Benn. Benn tries to pick a corner, but hits the crossbar. This happens 45 times in the same game.

2) The Panthers are playing the Islanders, and it's a shooting gallery for Florida. Mark Streit is on the ice for 200 shots against his team. Of these 200, 40 are blocked, 40 miss the net, and 120 get through to Al Montoya, who saves every one. Streit is also on the ice for his team's only goal of the game, which happened to be on a dump-in that squirted by Jose Theodore. He finishes the night a +1.

3) Shane Doan is on the goal line and tries to make a cross-crease pass. He misses his target by 5 feet and the puck comes right to Erik Johnson, defending for Colorado. Johnson tries to clear, but Kyle Quincey's positioning is poor, and Johnson's shot bounces off Quincey's shin pad and into the net. An "own goal" that gives Doan a +1 and Johnson a -1.

In the first example, Goligoski deserves some credit for making a great pass, but he's at the mercy of his linemates. In the second, Streit deserves some disparagement for being part of a unit that allows so many shots to Florida, but his goalie stood on his head. (Or, even more in-depth..maybe Streit had nothing to do with it! Maybe his teammates were so, so bad and essentially responsible for 195 of the 200 shots. Maybe some of them actually went in. Either way, Streit's plus-minus wouldn't reflect his true value.) In the third example, neither player involved deserved what they got (except Quincey, who probably deserves a ticket to Lake Erie in this scenario).

Here's a real-life example: Toni Lydman was paired with Lubomir Visnovsky all last year for the Ducks. A fine player, yes. He finished T-2 in the NHL at final +/- at a +32. Visnovsky was a +18 on the year. Fellow Ducks D-man Cam Fowler was a -25. What gives?

Here's what happened (and I credit Hockey Prospectus for the stats). Lydman was incredibly lucky to achieve this mark. While he was on the ice, his teammates' shooting percentage was 11.7%. The NHL league average has been roughly 9% every year since the lockout (and trending downward). See a problem here? Lydman's teammates shot the lights out while he was on the ice. That 11.7% average is only going to go down. Furthermore, Lydman's goaltenders' save percentage while he was on the ice was .927, much better than the Ducks' overall team save percentage of .912. Once these statistics normalize, Lydman's +/- will too. There's no way around it.

Here's something that may surprise you: for every single goal that is scored, on average, 35% of it is luck! And of that 35%, 33% of it is related to shooting percentage. This is courtesy of Gabriel Desjardins via Hockey Prospectus, who ran a study that completely blew my mind.

Desjardins computed that there are three main components to scoring a goal: quality of shot location, taking the shot in the first place, and the quality of the shot itself. Having the ability to get the shot off requires no luck at all. Either you can or you can't. Shot location is slightly influenced by luck, but not much.  However, shooting percentage is completely fluctuating and is 33% luck. Good players will score more, yes. Good players can pick corners better than others, I'm not denying that. But it's largely like batting average in baseball. Good baseball players also can hit a lot of hard balls right at people. Those outs aren't indicative of their talent. Good hockey players can sometimes get robbed by better saves.

Here's what you, the skeptic, is probably thinking: "Maybe Lydman and his teammates are just that good! Maybe Lydman keeps making perfect passes where his teammates have easy shots!" Sorry, I don't buy it. Keeping up a team shot percentage of 11.7% and a team save percentage of .912 are just unsustainable.

Credit to Hockey Prospectus here: the Ducks' PDO (a stat that adds their team save percentage and shooting percentage) in 2010-11 was 101.6. Typically, league average hovers around 100. Think about this: teams face/create roughly 5000 shots in a season. A meager 1% swing in this mark (back towards the league average) equates to 50 goals. If Lydman were on the ice a third of the time, that's about 17 goals, or roughly half of his +/-! Lydman, and Visnovsky to an extent, were beneficiaries of the right linemates at the right time.

(For these reasons, Corey Perry's insane 17.2% shot percentage will also go down, by the way. I don't believe he's a 50-goal scorer ever again. One way this could turn out being wrong: Anaheim's total lack of forward depth. They need him/Ryan/Getzlaf to score all of their goals because no one else will, and he might get 50 due to sheer shot volume. But he won't ever get 50 on 290 shots again. I digress.)

It's admirable to measure team contributions to goal scoring and prevention. There is definitely some defensive liability in Cam Fowler's -25 and some testament to good play in Toni Lydman's +32. +/- just isn't the best way to measure these things. Luckily, Hockey Prospectus and others are working on a solution: Corsi. Corsi is a lot like +/-, except using shot attempts instead of goals. It completely removes the fluctation and luck in actual goal scoring. Remember, 35% of goal scoring is luck. 33% of this is actually finishing the shot. Getting shots off and being in position to do so is much less influenced by luck. That's what Corsi measures: the shot attempts for and against a player while they are on the ice. Corsi doesn't care if the shot was blocked, if it goes in, or if it misses the net. That's the luck-based aspect of goal-scoring. We only care about a player's ability to create or prevent shots, and in turn, possession.

What's the best way to win a hockey game? Allow absolutely no shots against your goaltender, and take as many as possible. Corsi measures the ability of a player to essentially do this, and it does so from both a defensive and offensive perspective. It does what +/- attempts to do in a much less fluky way.

Note: you can break this down further to a player's role, what zone they started in, etc. And I probably will in a future post. But for now, it's not important to the main point.

I imagine this went a lot like the people who realized the problems with batting average in baseball. "Hey, let's measure the percentage that a player gets a hit." Great idea! Fast forward a bit: "Wait a minute, a walk is just as good as a hit sometimes." So on-base percentage is invented. "Wait a minute, home runs are more valuable than walks sometimes." So slugging percentage is invented. And now we use all three, in context, to better evaluate a player. And we also use those advanced stats to create more advanced stats like VORP.

Hockey is headed the same route, and I can't wait for that transformation. We already have GVT (hockey's version of VORP), and I would imagine that we are headed down a route of win expectancy as well. It's a lot harder to quantify, because hockey is free-flowing, unlike the rigid, event-turn based nature of baseball. But it can and will be done.

If this section sounds like an entire quote of Hockey Prospectus, that's because it pretty much is. I can't and won't take credit for any of this. But HP has finally put into numbers and words what I've longed for forever. I can't wait to get to work with Corsi in the future as a better tool of analyzing players, and use it to develop more advance metrics. It's only going to become more prevalent.

3. What's The Difference Anyway?

Too many hockey fans measure team performance in wins and losses. Yes, winning and losing is the crux of the game, but it's too simplistic to think about it in this way. Just like Moneyball says about player acquisition: teams should be trying to buy runs, not wins. It's the same in hockey. What happens over an 82-game season is largely a product of goal differential. When front offices look to acquire players, they should be trying to acquire players that can put their teams into creating goal scoring opportunities, and shutting down opponent's abilities of doing the same.

Goal differential is the key. Improve your goal differential, and you improve your chances of winning games over the long term. Since goal scoring is fluctuating and very much influenced by luck, it's not enough to acquire the players with the highest goal totals. We need to look at the bigger picture, a larger sample size. We need to dig deeper. That's what the advanced stats I described in the last section do, and that's what GVT also does. It measures a player's contributions in goals over replacement level for the same amount of ice time. It's really a great summation of a player's contributions to a team.

Bottom line, even terrible teams can put up five goals in a game, or allow zero. Sometimes, they can even do it in the same game. But putting together a winning team is about some combination of the two over the long haul. I'm not interested in how we improve our goal differential. If we score 500 goals and allow 350, that's the same to me as if we score 200 and allow 50. Both teams are probably going to win the same number of games. For real life, think of it in context of a team scoring 200 and allowing 160, or a team scoring 230 and allowing 190. Two ways to skin a cat here; I'm going to pick whichever is more cost efficient given my team's constraints of the salary cap.

You can acquire skaters with a high defensive GVT, a high offensive GVT, or preferably, players that have both. Perhaps even more preferably, players that can do both in ways that don't show up on the back of his hockey card, and thus probably cost less. That's who I'm going to target. I don't know if there is a more important statement in this entire essay.

4. Scouting Is Still Important Too

People call baseball a team game, but it really isn't. Think about it. The only time any teamwork is needed is on turning double plays, cutoff throws, and the pitcher-catcher interaction. The rest of a baseball game (and the meat of it) is hundreds of disjointed events that create situations. These situations are then acted on entirely by individual effort. Alex Rodriguez has no control over what Robinson Cano does in front of him. If Cano gets on base with one out, maybe A-Rod tries to move him over. Maybe he tries to hit a homer. Regardless, there is no teamwork involved in A-Rod's success or failure here. This is why it is much easier to measure a baseball player's value than a hockey player's, especially a hitter's. That's also why I 100% subscribe to stats before scouting, as far as baseball is concerned. Give me a player that can get on base and not create outs. Very simplistic, I know, but this is a hockey blog. I think you get what I'm going for here.

In hockey, it's different. Hockey is perhaps the most team-intrinsic game there is. It's much harder to measure hockey in this way because of this team-based nature. Goal scoring is almost entirely a team effort. It flows together. Run scoring in baseball largely is not.

Here's a typical baseball sequence: Player A does something --> break in play --> player B comes up and does something else --> runs may or may not score.

Here's a hockey sequence: Player A passes to player B  --> teammates move simultaneously --> player B notices movement and passes to player C --> player C scores.

Yes, in baseball, one event leads to the next, but those two events are entirely independent of one another. The simultaneous, dynamic movement of hockey makes contribution more difficult to measure. This is why I cannot say (or no one should ever say) that I 100% prefer to ignore scouting in hockey.

What's the reason hockey is the hardest sport to play in existence? Because it involves an entirely new method of movement. Football, basketball, baseball, etc are hard, yes. I know. But what isn't hard is moving around in those sports. Anyone who plays them can move without thinking about it. LeBron James doesn't have to think about how he's going to run up the court. In hockey, that's not the case. The method of moving from point A to point B is an entirely new, not-naturally learned skill. And it's the entire foundation of the game. If you can't skate, you can't move, and if you can't move, you can't do anything. This is, simplistically, why I believe that scouts should 100% prefer skating ability to anything else, all things considered.

Positioning is also extremely important. When I watch a game, I'm watching to see where players are away from the puck. Are they putting themselves in position to create or deny future shot attempts (thus affecting their Corsi)? You can see how scouting and statistics work hand-in-hand here.

The key with these skills I am singling out is that they cannot be accurately represented in numbers. A player's shot strength translates to goal scoring, which can be measured in more advanced metrics. Of course I am interested in if a player has a laser, but I can "see" these things through statistics much more clearly than I can skating and positioning.

I had the fortune to attend about 30 home games of the Columbus Blue Jackets last season. Watching hockey live is an entirely different experience from on television. You can see these things much more clearly. You can see who is affecting the game more than others, and by attending several games in sequence, you can see who has the consistency. I learned more about hockey last year than the other 19 previous years of my life combined because I had the ability to attend games in person regularly. That cannot be replaced by a stat-sheet.

How These Things Work Together

I watch games taking all of these things into account. When I'm watching a team play, I'm thinking about the player's cap hit, his ability to create and deny shots, and his physical tools/hockey sense. I decide value based on these things. It's all about possession and goal differential for the cost it requires me to pay for it. Groundbreaking? No. But I'm not trying to break new ground...yet. I'm trying to assert myself in this industry.  I still have so, so much more to learn.

Why I'm Here

Let me preface this by what I'm sure the three people who will actually read this today are thinking: I don't expect readers on this. I'm not doing this to get hits. I'm doing this to get my thoughts down in one place, and to help me reflect on them in the future.

Now that that's out of the way, let me tell you a little bit about myself. My name is Ryan Schwepfinger and I like hockey. That's it.

I've wanted to work in sports since I knew the definition of the word "career," and I have wanted to work in hockey since the very first time I heard a goal horn. I love the game and I think about it constantly. I currently am a Public Relations intern for the New York Rangers, the first step to what I hope is a career in the game I love. I got the idea to start a blog while at work, from a "career tips" sheet that Madison Square Garden human resources posted on our Facebook site.

Since I tweet about hockey constantly, I thought it was a nice piece of advice. Here, I won't annoy friends who dislike the game, and I won't have character constraints. It's also a nice archive of my thoughts and thought process for how I approach the game and my future career. It's a lot easier to show a GM in a future job interview what I've written than to simply say "I have a passion for this game like no other, so hire me!" I'm hoping what I write here could be a nice supplement to my resume and cover letter one day; almost like a built-in look into my mind so teams know just what they'd be getting by bringing me aboard.

Of course, I dream of a career in hockey operations. I watch games a bit differently than a fan would. I am at the point in my life where I am not a fan anymore. I am a professional in the industry (yes, I know I am just an intern in the industry). Regardless, if you dress for the position you want instead of the one you have, as they say, you have to think the same way. I try to think like a GM, and I'll explain this in my next post (my manifesto of how I approach hockey, of sorts).

For now, to close this introduction, I want to share a piece of writing I penned back when I was 18 years old.

At the time of the 2008 NHL trade deadline, I was an enormous Pittsburgh fan. I didn't really know the intricacies of the salary cap. I didn't know how many NHL games or calendar days could elapse after clearing waivers for a player to become waiver-exempt no longer (among other complex rules that I now have committed to memory). I just wanted the Penguins to improve their team. I expressed as much on this post from February 25, 2008, at a well-known hockey fan site:

"Hello everyone...I'm a first time writer, long time reader. I love the community aspect of this site and I'd like to share some of my thoughts about your Pittsburgh Penguins.

There are tons of rumors out there involving the Penguins. The most prevalent one as of now seems to be Staal and some sort of package going to Chicago for T. Ruutu and Havlat. Some conflicting reports say that the Hawks would want Esposito and not Staal.


If I were Ray Shero, I would hold on to Staal at all costs. I can see a Selke trophy in Staal's future. The value of his contributions is immense: he's long been a PK stalwart and he's also getting some PP time lately. Sure, his points are down, but anyone who watches the Pens on a regular basis can see the measurable impact he has on the game. He should be deemed untouchable.


Optimally, the guy I'd like to see jettisoned is Ryan Whitney. He has value as an offensive defenseman and possibly as a power play quarterback, but his contributions on defense are so shoddy. At least once per game, he will make some type of play that directly leads to the opposition scoring. It's become inevitable. Yesterday vs. San Jose, Cheechoo totally burned him in a pivotal point of the game. That type of play is typical Whitney. I think Pittsburgh has more than enough offensive defensemen (Gonchar, Letang, Goligoski coming up), so Whitney is expendable. He could probably could net us somebody decent as part of a package, maybe involving Armstrong or Christensen and a pick.


I know Shero isn't looking to do anything big. I know we'll probably end up making a minor deal or two, very similar to last year. But I think the time is now for Pittsburgh. The pieces are in place to make a very serious cup run either this year or next if we can get a scoring winger and a stay-at-home defenseman.


My thoughts: look into getting Barret Jackman from St. Louis, and look into making a deal with Chicago involving Esposito for possibly one of Havlat or Ruutu. I would make our first round pick available, because really, how much more young talent do we need?


Either way, I'm excited for tomorrow. I think everybody is" 


Here's the link if you'd like to see the original: http://my.hockeybuzz.com/blog.php?user_id=43550&post_id=4468

Why do I find this significant? Let's sum up the key points of my opinion here, keeping in mind I wrote this one day before the NHL trade deadline, 2008:
- Despite rumors, make Jordan Staal untouchable, his defensive contributions and strength down the middle too valuable.
- Look to move Ryan Whitney, he is defensively subpar, and players like Letang and Goligoski in the system who are quantifiably better.
- Look to package Whitney with Christensen, Armstrong, and a pick for a winger.
- Make the first round pick in 2008 available.
- The pieces are in place for Pittsburgh to make a cup run within two years if they acquire a scoring winger and a stay-at-home defensema; contrary to most people's beliefs that the team isn't ready to win.
- Shop Angelo Esposito in any potential deal as a "top prospect."

Let's review what actually occurred for the Penguins after this post:
- The day after this post, 2/26/08, Pittsburgh traded Angelo Esposito, Colby Armstrong, Erik Christensen, and a first-round draft pick to Atlanta for Marian Hossa and Pascal Dupuis. They also acquired Hal Gill from Toronto for two picks.
- Less than a year later, on 1/8/09, Pittsburgh signed Jordan Staal to a four-year extension.
- On 2/26/09, Pittsburgh traded Ryan Whitney to Anaheim for Chris Kunitz and Eric Tangradi.They acquired Bill Guerin a few days later.
- Pittsburgh went to the Stanley Cup final in 08, and won it in 09.

Notice anything? The very players/pieces that I thought Pittsburgh should move were moved. The very players/types of players I thought they should acquire and/or maintain were brought in. And the team got better for it.

It was pretty incredible for me to stumble upon this old post a few months ago and realize how eerily correct I was. Perhaps even more incredible is acknowledging how little I knew about hockey in 2008 compared to now. I've spent the better part of the last three years studying the game, the CBA, the salary cap, etc. I was fascinated by going back and reading this years down the line, and I hope to garner similar fascination from sharing my thoughts here.

Bottom line, this blog is meant to get my thoughts in one place. I hope to be able to use this for reflection, for organization, and above all, enjoyment. I love talking about the game, I love thinking like a GM, and I love sharing my thoughts (at least while I can!).

Next up: the manifesto of how I think about hockey. Stay tuned.